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Available online 30 July 2010 Developing Asia experienced a sharp surge in foreign currency reserves prior to the 2008–9
crisis. The global crisis has been associated with an unprecedented rise of swap agreements
between central banks of larger economies and their counterparts in smaller economies. We
explore whether such swap lines can reduce the need for reserve accumulation. The evidence
suggests that there is only a limited scope for swaps to substitute for reserves. The selectivity of
the swap lines indicates that only countries with signiﬁcant trade and ﬁnancial linkages can
expect access to such ad hoc arrangements, on a case by case basis. Moral hazard concerns
suggest that the applicability of these arrangements will remain limited. However, deepening
swap agreements and regional reserve pooling arrangements may weaken the precautionary
motive for reserve accumulation.
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1. Introduction
By any measure, developing Asia (henceforth Asia) has experienced an unprecedented build-up of FX reserves since the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–8. Asia's reserves have surged from US$202 billion in 1990 to US$3371 billion in 2008. The growth rate has
accelerated since 2000, with reserves growing on average by more than 20% per year. China has deﬁnitely played a signiﬁcant role
in the build-up, accounting for more than 50% of the 1990–2008 growth, but the build-up is a region-wide phenomenon. The
pattern is similar even if we account for the region's rapid economic growth — the region's reserves-to-GDP ratio tripled from
13.1% in 1990 to 40.2% in 2008. The explosive growth of Asia's reserves is part of a broader trend of reserve build-up in developing
countries in general. The share of global reserves accounted for by developing countries has risen from 28% to 65% between 1990
and 2008. In Asia's case, the reserve build-up has been largely driven by a sharp reversal of the current account position since the
crisis. While the region as a whole ran a small current account deﬁcit prior to the crisis, it has run a sizable and persistent current
account surplus since the crisis. In some countries such as PRC and Korea, an important additional source of reserve growth has
been net capital inﬂows. As of December 2009, no fewer than six Asian developing countries were among the world's ten largest
holders of FX reserves— China, India, Taipei, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR. In addition, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Viet Nam and Kazakhstan also have large and growing amounts of FX reserves.
Broadly speaking, there are twomain explanations for the extraordinary growth of Asia's FX reserves in the post-crisis period: (i)
precautionary self-insurance against ﬁnancial crisis and (ii) mercantilist export promotion. The Asian crisis had a devastating
economic and social impact onAsia. Although5 countries– Indonesia, Korea,Malaysia, Philippines andThailand–bore thebruntof the
impact, the psychological impact of the crisis extended to the entire region.While there is a great deal of controversy about the causes
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of the crisis, what directly precipitated the crisis was a shortage of international liquidity. Therefore, one plausible interpretation of
Asia's reserve hoarding is that it is an attempt to build up an ample war chest of international liquidity to protect oneself against a
repeat of the Asian crisis. This type of demand for reserves is known as the precautionary or self-insurance demand for reserves. The
other main beneﬁt of reserves is that buying foreign currencies to hold down domestic currencies can improve external
competitiveness and thus promote exports. This type of demand for reserves is known as the mercantilist demand for reserves.
Aizenman and Lee (2007) provide comprehensive discussions of both precautionary andmercantilist demand for reserves. A study of
the twomotives in Asia by Aizenman and Lee (2007)ﬁnds that bothmotives are at play in the region's reserve build-up. There is yet a
thirdmotive for holding reserves, which is related to the ﬁrst two but somewhat different— exchange rate stability, outlined by Calvo
and Reinhart (2002). Exchange rate stability is often a keymacroeconomic policy objective and in that case, rapid reserve growthmay
be the result of systematic foreign market interventions aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate.
The differentmotives behind Asia's reserve accumulation are notmutually exclusive from a theoretical point of view and hence
very difﬁcult to distinguish empirically. Indeed efforts to empirically distinguish between the precautionary and mercantilist
motives may ultimately be unproductive. It is precisely because a more competitive exchange rate allows a country to improve its
current account position that the country is able to build up the reserves it needs for precautionary purposes. From the perspective
of the global reserve currency system, regardless of the relative importance of the different motives, the massive purchase of US
dollar-denominated reserve assets – i.e. US government and government sponsored enterprise (GSE) securities – by Asian
countries has the effect of bolstering the status of the dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency. The dollar standard or
Bretton Woods II view of global imbalances (see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, & Garber, 2009) is closely tied to the mercantilist
demand for reserves. According to this view, much of Asia has in effect reverted to the tightly managed dollar-based exchange rate
regimes, after a brief experimentation with more ﬂexibility during the Asian crisis period. The term Bretton Woods II draws an
analogy between the exchange rate behavior of Asian countries since the Asian crisis and the BrettonWoods system of pegged but
adjustable exchange rates that was in place between 1945 and the early 1970s.
The desirability of the fast accumulation of FX reserves in Asia remains debatable (see Cheung & Qian, 2009). As noted earlier,
holding reserves entails a number of potential beneﬁts — precautionary self-insurance, export promotion and exchange rate
stability. At the same time, countries also incur substantial costs when they accumulate large amounts of reserves. These include
inﬂationary pressures due to expansion of monetary base, ﬁscal costs which arise if the interest rate on sterilization bonds exceeds
the interest rate earned on reserve assets, and potentially higher interest rates required to induce the public to hold ever-larger
amounts of sterilization bonds. The presence of both costs and beneﬁts implies an optimal reserve level, above which more
reserves subtract from rather than add to national welfare. According to most conventional measures of reserve adequacy, the
region now has reserves far in excess of all plausible estimates of what it needs. According to one such measure, the Greenspan–
Guidotti rule, a country has adequate reserves if its reserves exceed its short-term debt.1 The underlying notion here is that a
country which has reserves exceeding all external debt falling within one year should be able to service its most urgent external
obligations even during a ﬁnancial crisis. At the end of 2008, all of Asia's top 10 reserve holders passed the Greenspan–Guidotti
rule, some by a wide margin. Most other reserve adequacy measures also point to an abundance of reserves.2
The growing consensus that the region now has substantial amounts of surplus reserves has led to calls for managing such
reserves more actively. In the period immediately preceding the global ﬁnancial crisis, parking surplus reserves in safe and liquid
but low-yielding US government securities was increasingly seen as a waste of valuable national resources. The creation of
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) such as China Investment Corporation (CIC) and Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) represents a
policy response to a growing popular pressure for using surplus reserves for active proﬁt-seeking investment rather than passive
liquidity management.3 In addition to the opportunity costs of foregoing more productive and proﬁtable investment
opportunities, the global ﬁnancial crisis has exposed the risks of investing in industrialized countries. More speciﬁcally, the
crisis, which originated in industrialized countries, tarnished their long-standing reputation for safe and efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets
as well as sound ﬁnancial regulation and macroeconomic policies. The upshot for Asia's reserve management is that holding
massive amounts of reserves in the form of US government securities is not without risks, especially in light of the deterioration of
public ﬁnances due to the current ﬁscal stimulus. A sustained depreciation of the US dollar and consequent valuation losses is
another large potential cost confronting Asia's biggest reserve holders in the post-crisis period.
We have just seen that holding large amounts of reserves entails signiﬁcant costs and risks for Asian countries. One way to reduce
such costs is to use reserves more productively via sovereign funds andmore generally, by active reservemanagement. Although the
global ﬁnancial crisis has inﬂicted heavy losses on Asian sovereign funds and temporarily dampened their risk appetite, they provide
an important channel for more productive use of reserves in the medium- and long-term. There are already signs that the funds are
returning to the ﬁnancial markets, and there are indications that China may inject up to US$250 billion of fresh capital into CIC.
1 The focus on short term total external debt/international reserves makes sense if sudden stop crises have a duration shorter than a year. Yet, some severe
events, like the global crisis of 2008–9, may have lingering effects well beyond a year. Hence, prudent regulators may pay attention to the external debt maturity
structure of a country, looking beyond the short-term debt/International reserve ratio. In the same vein, the regulator may pay attention to both the private and
the public external debt maturity structure.
2 Park and Estrada (2009) provide a comprehensive analysis of the issue of whether Asia's reserves have reached excessive levels. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and
Taylor (2010) ﬁnd empirical support a broader self-insurance view, where reserves provide a buffer against both deleveraging initiated by foreign parties and
sudden demand of domestic residents for external assets, i.e., “sudden capital ﬂight.” The high positive co-movement of international reserves and M2 is
consistent with the view that the greatest capital-ﬂight risks are posed by the most liquid assets, i.e., by the liquid liabilities of the banking system captured by
M2.
3 Park (2007) provides a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of Asian SWFs.
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Furthermore, if we view reserves as insurance against unexpected shortage of international liquidity and ﬁnancial crisis, pooling risks
is more efﬁcient than individual risk bearing. That is, collective insurance is always less costly than self insurance. The seemingly
irrational behavior of reserve hoarding can partly be explained by the region's loss of conﬁdence in the IMF during the Asian crisis. In
principle, the IMF pools the risks of all countries and thus offers the most efﬁcient collective insurance. In practice, a region wide
perception that the IMFhasmishandled the Asian crisis, compoundedby a broader regionwideperception that the IMFdoes not serve
the interests of Asian countries, has eroded the region's conﬁdence in IMF. Regardlessof the validity of theperceptions, theperceptions
themselves have contributed to a marked preference of self-insurance over collective insurance.
The central objective of this paper is to explore one alternative mechanism for reducing the need for precautionary reserves,
namely swap agreements or swap lines between central banks of large economic powers and their counterparts in smaller
economies. The global ﬁnancial crisis has witnessed a proliferation of such agreements. Perhaps the most well-known example is
the US$30 billion swap lines between the US Fed and the central banks of Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Singapore opened in October
2008 during the peak of the crisis.4 In principle, swaps can either substitute for or complement reserves. To the extent that swaps
provide the international liquidity needed during emergencies, central banks can cut back on their reserve holdings. On the other
hand, only countries with large reserves may be able to secure swap agreements and this may encourage countries to accumulate
more reserves. In addition, large reserves and swap lines can jointly restore the conﬁdence of ﬁnancial markets in a country's
liquidity and solvency. The broader issue of interest is whether swap lines can have a perceptible deterrent effect on the speed and
scale of Asia's reserve accumulation. An important integral part of Asia's swap agreements is the ChiangMai Initiative (CMI) which
encompasses a network of bilateral agreements between ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Korea).
The unprecedented provision of $120 billion in swap lines to 4 the emerging markets by the US Fed in October 2008 provided
welcome relief and an important signal to the ﬁnancialmarkets. Yet the exposure of US bankswas the singlemost important criterion
for extending swap-lines to the four countries (see Aizenman& Pasricha, 2010). These ad hoc facilities would not sufﬁce in protecting
exposed countries from an Asian crisis-type crisis in the absence of self insurance. Furthermore, the selectivity of the swap lines
suggests that only countrieswith solid past record of governance and signiﬁcant trade and ﬁnancial linkages can expect access to such
ad hoc arrangements, on a case by case basis. Moral hazard concerns suggest that the applicability of these arrangements will remain
limited.Mitigatingmoral hazard shouldbe theprime responsibility of the internationalﬁnancial institutions, inparticular the IMF.Due
to the “cherry picking”nature of the swap lines between central banks, access to IMF lines of creditwould remain a valuable option for
many developing countries, but it is an option that countries may choose to avoid by means of alternative insurance arrangements.
Speciﬁcally, regions characterized by deepening trade and ﬁnancial integration may consider cooperative regional
arrangements, including regional swap-lines and international reserves pooling agreements. Asia is a good example of a region
that stands to gain substantially from collective regional insurance. Intra-Asian trade has grown rapidly in recent years and this
trend is likely to gather speed in light of the general weakness of the industrialized countries and hence their diminished appetite
for imports. The prospective rebalancing of Asian countries toward domestic demand should also strengthen intra-regional trade,
especially in ﬁnal goods. The resulting shift of intra-Asian trade from parts and components to ﬁnal goods will make trade among
Asian economies less dependent upon ﬁnal demand from outside the region. While intra-Asian ﬁnancial integration lags far
behind intra-Asian trade integration, we can expect ﬁnancial linkages to grow as the regional economies become ﬁnancially more
developed. A further impetus for intra-regional ﬁnancial integration may come from heightened reluctance to invest in
industrialized countries in the wake of the global crisis. Other characteristics of Asian countries which work in the favor of swap
arrangements and regional reserve pooling include high reserve-GDP ratios, high saving rates and lingering mistrust of the IMF.
2. Swap lines and international reserves
Swap lines may act to stabilize market concerns about the risk of losing control due to deleveraging pressures, thereby
preventing downward pressure on international reserves and the exchange rate, substituting the need to hoard reserves. This
possibly was the case of Korea, where the introduction of the Fed swap line prevented a replay of the crisis dynamics of 1997 (see
Park, 2009). In these circumstances, access to swap lines would mitigate the need for Korea to hoard reserves to replace the
60 billion dollars of reserves it used during the ﬁrst phase of the crisis. Yet, uncertainty regarding the duration of these swap lines,
and lingering concerns that in the absence of these swap lines the initial level of reserves was insufﬁcient to prevent crisis
dynamics may induce Korea to further accumulate reserves in the future. Therefore, intuitively, perceptions about the duration of
swap lines play a key role in determining the future path of reserves. To the degree that regional arrangements like the ChiangMai
Initiative offer pooling schemes of indeﬁnite duration, they may mitigate the urge to hoard reserves. Greater use of regional swap
lines may also reduce excessive hoarding precipitated by the wish to signal that the country's reserves are above the average of its
neighbours [the “keeping with the Joneses” motive, see Cheung and Qian (2009)].
A related issue is the currency composition of swap lines. There is no reason why swap lines have to be denominated solely in
US dollars. Just as countries typically hold reserves in different currencies, they could agree to help each other by providing a
4 Such a swap line is a transaction where the supplying Central Bank (US FED), offers a credit line of 30 billion US $ to a foreign central bank, say the Bank of
Korea, for a pre-set duration. The swap provides the Bank of Korea with the option of borrowing up to 30 billion US $, at a pre-set interest rate, for a pre-set time.
The swap line augments the initial international reserves position of the Bank of Korea with the option to borrow international reserves. By exercising the swap
line, the Bank of Korea may mitigate, in the short-run, the dollar shortage propagated by delivering pressure induced by the global crisis. Such a swap line
outsources the US FED dollar printing press capacity to the Bank of Korea, exposing the US FED to the sovereign risk associated with lending dollar to foreign
central banks. This exposure implies that the US FED provides such swap lines on a case by case basis, for a pre-set duration.
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basket of currencies rather than a single currency. The denomination of swap lines in non-dollar currencies will speed up the
diversiﬁcation of reserves away from dollars into other currencies. For example, euro-denominated swap lines will raise the
demand for euro reserves since swap lines are ultimately amutual promise to provide liquidity support in case of emergencies and
that promise will not be credible in the absence of reserves. For Asian countries, a more realistic scenario is the denomination of
swap lines in the currency of a dominant regional economy such as China or even a real or notional Asian currency. Such
development would further speed up the shift away from dollar reserves and the emergence of an Asia-speciﬁc hard currency
much like the Europe-speciﬁc euro. In fact, China's central bank has already entered into yuan-denominated swap agreements
with its counterparts in Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Belarus, Indonesia and Argentina.5 A number of other central banks have also
expressed a willingness to enter into swap agreements with China. The growing popularity of yuan swaps reﬂects the rapid
emergence of China as a globally signiﬁcant trading power. Despite China's ﬁnancial underdevelopment and the yuan's restricted
convertibility, growing trade with China gives the yuan some intrinsic value.
There is also an intriguing possibility that broadening and deepening of the Chiang Mai Initiative could result in a more
permanent and institutionalized form of regional precautionary insurance against ﬁnancial crisis. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
was announced by the ﬁnance ministers of ASEAN+3 – ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea – in May 2000. In the wake of the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998, the CMI was designed to address short-term liquidity problems and to supplement existing
international ﬁnancial arrangements in the event of a crisis. The initiative consisted of an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement
(ASA) involving all ASEAN members, a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) and repurchase facilities among ASEAN+3.
By December 2008, the size of the BSA had increased to $84 billion [Table 1].
The leaders ofASEAN+3decided topush for themultilateralizationof theCMI inOctober2008.Multilateralizationmeans that funds
available under the CMI would be managed as a self-managed reserve pooling arrangement, governed by a single contract, reducing
waste and inefﬁciency. At this time, the countries also agreed that ASEAN's share of contribution in the total reserve poolwould be 20%
while the combined share of PRC, Korea, and Japanwould be 80%. In February 2009, the ASEAN+3 ﬁnanceministers agreed to expand
the pool of foreign-currency reserves from $80 billion to $120 billion. The most substantive progress toward multilateralization took
place in May 2009, when the ﬁnance ministers agreed upon the governing mechanisms and implementation plan for the CMI
multilateralization (CMIM). The politically trick issue of relative contributions among the big three powers was resolved, with Japan
and PRC each contributing 32% and Korea contributing 16%. Other details such as voting rights, decisionmaking rules, and operational
issues such as activation of short-term liquidity in case of a sovereign ﬁnancial emergency were also agreed upon.6
Especially signiﬁcant was the agreement to establish an independent regional surveillance unit which would monitor the
region's economies and support CMIM decision-making. While the formal unit is being set up, the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) and
ADB are working out an interim surveillance arrangement based on existing surveillance process. The ASEAN+3 independent
regional surveillance unit is intended to supplement rather than replace the IMF. It is primarily a mechanism for objective
economic monitoring. Under the CMIM, a country can draw up to 20% of its quota without being subject to IMF conditionality,
although the duration is restricted to amaximumof 6 months. Should a country avail itself of its full quota, 80% of the total amount
disbursed would be tied to an IMF program. Once the regional surveillance unit becomes fully operational, the amount that
5 More speciﬁcally, the central banks of China and South Korea signed a 180 billion yuan currency swap framework agreement on December 12, 2008. The
People's Bank of China entered into a 200 billion yuan swap with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on January 20, 2009; an 80 billion yuan agreement with
Malaysia's central bank on February 8; a 20 billion yuan deal with the National Bank of Belarus on March 11, a 100 billion yuan swap with the central bank of
Indonesia on March 24, and an 80 billion yuan swap with the central bank of Argentina. The swaps will allow the parties to avoid using dollars in trade between
them and China.
6 For the full text of the agreement, please visit http://www.asean.org/22536.htm.
Table 1
Swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative (as of December 2008).
From To Total
China Japan Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
China 3.0 4.0 4.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 16.5
Japan 3.0 13.0 6.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 6.0 38.0
Korea 4.0 8.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 18.5
Indonesia 2.0 2.0
Malaysia 1.5 1.5
Philippines 0.5 2.0 2.5
Singapore 1.0 1.0
Thailand 3.0 1.0 4.0
Cambodia 0.0
Lao PDR 0.0
Myanmar 0.0
Vietnam 0.0
Sub-total 7.0 15.5 23.5 12.0 4.0 10.0 3.0 9.0 84.0
ASEAN swap agreement (among the 10 ASEAN countries) 2.0
Total 86.0
Source: Elaborations based on Japan's Ministry of Finance website. Available from:http://www.mof.go.jp/english/index.htm. Accessed: February 2009.
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member countries can withdrawwithout IMF conditionality could be increased. The collective CMIM agreement on the process of
managing a regional pool of international reserves marks a major milestone in institutionalizing Asian regionalism.
3. The global ﬁnancial crisis, the dollar standard's sustainability, and alternative options
The global ﬁnancial crisis, which originated inmarket failures in the housing and ﬁnancialmarkets of the US, brings into question the
desirability and feasibilityofpeggingAsian currencies to thedollar as thekeystone for the regional stability and futuregrowth. Thealleged
gains from pegging to the dollar are debatable, and there is scarcity of studies that tested it carefully against alternative hypotheses. The
instability of the dollar against the euro and other key currencies implies that pegging to the dollarwould increase the domestic currency
volatility against the euro, pound and other currencies. This effectmay be sub-optimal for countries that trade heavilywith the euro bloc
and experience an increase in such trade over time. One way to deal with this issue is to evaluate what would have been the optimal
weight of achieving real exchange stability against a basket of currencies that reﬂect the actual trading patterns of the region.
Recent studies dealing with the Trilemma (Aizenman, Chinn, & Ito, 2010) are consistent with the notion that emerging market
countries havemoved towards the Trilemmamiddle ground, associatedwith greater exchange rateﬂexibility and limited but growing
ﬁnancial integration, buffered by sizable reserve holdings.7 This has enabled them to retain a degree of monetary autonomy, even as
ﬁnancial integration continued — e.g., Indian and China before the crisis, a time that both countries grew rapidly while maintaining
controlled ﬁnancial openness and limited exchange rate ﬂexibility. During that time, the Chinese yuan appreciated signiﬁcantly,
without obvious downside effects. The onset of the crisis led to the renewed pegging of the yuan to the dollar, but is not self-evident
that returning to a rigid peg to the dollar is desirable and sustainable in the post-crisis period. Applying data predating the crisis,
Aizenman et al. (2010) failed to ﬁnd evidence that countries which pegged their currency to the dollar preformed on average better
than those that allowed controlledﬂexibility. During crises,manydeveloping countries found that allowing the real exchange rate and
monetary policy to initially take the brunt of the required adjustment to a crisis facilitated the adjustment process.Wewill look at the
recent history of the region to assess the potential gains from prolonging the dollar standard.
3.1. Korea's Financial Turmoil in the Second Half of 2008: The Use of Both Reserves and Swaps
During the secondhalf of 2008, Korea used both FX reserves and swap lines to copewith turbulence in its FX andﬁnancialmarkets.
The primary transmission channel which spread the global ﬁnancial crisis to Asia was the collapse of trade and exports. By and large,
Asian ﬁnancial systemswere relatively immune from the turbulence which afﬂicted their counterparts in the US and EU. However, in
the case of Korea, the global crisis also had adverse effects on both the real economy and ﬁnancial system. During the course of 2008,
Korea suffered anunusually high degree ofﬁnancial instability relative to other countries in the region. The instability reached its peak
duringOctoberwhen theKoreanwon teeteredon the verge of collapse [Fig. 1] and the stockmarket plungedbyone third [Fig. 2]. There
waseven speculationof a repeat of theAsiancrisiswhichhadwrought havoc on theKoreaneconomy. Theﬁnancial stresswaspuzzling
in light of Korea's relatively strongmacroeconomic fundamentals— e.g. GDPgrowth, current account balance andﬁscal balance— and
microeconomic fundamentals — e.g. balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions and corporations. Equally puzzling was the fact that
Korea's fundamentals were at least as strong as and certainly not visibly worse than those of comparable countries such as NIEs or the
ASEAN-4,whichwere spared suchﬁnancial turbulence. Furthermore, Koreawas theworld's sixth largest holder of FX reserveswhen it
entered the crisis, and its reserve level comfortably passed conventional tests of reserve adequacy.
The most likely answer to the puzzle lies in Korea's exceptionally high degree of capital degree liberalization. For example,
there are almost no restrictions on foreign residents' purchase and sale of domestic equities or domestic ﬁnancial institutions'
foreign borrowing. Growing ﬁnancial integration kicked off by liberalization since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis led to rapid increase in
the share of foreign investments in Korean's stock market capitalization, from less than 5% in 1992 to more than 35% by 2005. In
addition, the share of equity investment in total foreign investment is third highest among 30 OECD economies, at 39.0% [Fig. 3].
The large exposure of Korean banks to short-term foreign loans arose from their taking counterparty positions to the purchases of
forward exchange contracts by shipbuilders keen to hedge themselves against exchange rate risk. The rollover rate on those loans
fell sharply as a result of the global credit crunch and the resulting repayment pressures precipitated the freefall of the won in
October. Hedge funds and other foreign residents withdrew from Korean equities in droves to reinforce their balance sheets back
home as the global ﬁnancial crisis intensiﬁed. Total net sales of equities by foreign residents exceeded 43 trillion won during 2008.
Those sales were themain drivers of the year-long plunge of the equitymarket and also contributed to thewon debacle in October.
The Korean experience should serve as a cautionary tale for other developing Asian countries about the substantial risks of capital
account liberalization. Countries which are more open toward cross-border capital ﬂows will suffer disproportionately when
foreign residents withdraw their funds from the local ﬁnancial markets.
The Korean government took a number of decisive policy actions to contain the ﬁnancial turmoil. The Bank of Korea (BOK) spent
around US$60 billion trying to defend the won but without much success [Fig. 4]. There were some reservations about how BOK
handled its FXmarket intervention, especially in terms of communicating its intentions clearly theﬁnancialmarkets, but the upshot is
that even sustained and massive intervention failed to restore stability. The centre-piece of a bailout package the government ﬁnally
unveiled in response to the mounting market pressure was a $100 billion, three-year government guarantee for banks' debt raised
abroad before July 2009. This sum ismore than sufﬁcient to cover Korean banks' foreign debtmaturing by June 2009, estimated by the
7 Both trends are more pronounced for the emerging markets than for the non-emerging developing countries.
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Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance to be about $80 billion. Yet, despite the large stockpile of FX reserves used to ﬁnance the
bailout package, market pressures did not subside. The limited effectiveness of high reserves-to-GDP ratio in containing market
pressures reﬂects Korea's vulnerability tobalance sheet effects due to its heavy short termborrowing in foreign currencies aswell as its
vulnerability to massive deleveraging by foreign portfolio investors during the global crisis (see Aizenman, 2009).
Korea regained a measure of stability in its ﬁnancial markets only after the Bank of Korea entered into a $30 billion swap
agreement with the US Federal Reserve. The BOK-Fed swap agreement came into effect on 30 October 2008 and was part of a
network of $30 billion agreements that the Fed simultaneously signed with the central banks of 4 emerging markets — Brazil,
Korea, Mexico and Singapore. The initial swap arrangement was in effect until April 2009 but has been twice extended since then,
Fig. 2. KOSPI monthly average, January 2008–January 2010.
Fig. 3. Equity investment as share of total foreign investment, selected OECD countries.
Fig. 1. Korean won per US dollar, January 2008–January 2010.
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up to February 2010. The facilities were designed to support the provision of US dollar liquidity to fundamentally sound and well-
managed emerging markets which faced the risk of shortage of US dollar funding due to unfavorable global liquidity conditions.
Koreamade the swap deal as part of efforts to secure secondary support measures, not because of any shortage of reserves. Further
bolstering market conﬁdence were two additional swap agreements reached with China and Japan in mid-December 2008, which
expanded Korea's existing swap lines with the two countries to US$30 billion each. A simpliﬁed overall picture of the Korean
experience is as follows: a country with an ample pool of reserves tries to defend its currency with massive but ineffective FX
market intervention, and is ultimately rescued by swap agreements.
4. Empirical analysis of swap lines
In this section, we report and discuss the results of our empirical analysis of swap lines. Our analysis is based on cross-country
data. The swap lines since December 2007 to date involve 24 countries as shown in Table 2. Collectively, the economic size of the
swap providers and recipients is equal to 85% of world GDP. In term of the initial swap amounts, the US Federal Reserve has been
the largest provider, extending 14 swap lines, 755 billion USD in total. The People Bank of China has provided swap lines to 6
countries (650 billion yuan) and the European Central Bank commits 4 swap lines (31.5 billion euros).
While the swap lines provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England are by far the largest,
many believe that the swap commitments among these central banks could be even larger. However, the claim that some of the swap
lines are inﬁnite or unlimited is probably overstating the evidence. The swap lines involved the OECD countries are more elastic at the
Fig. 4. Korea's FX reserves, January 2008–January 2010.
Table 2
This table provides the initial swap lines provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve (billion USD), the European Central Bank (billion Euro), and the People Bank of China
(billion yuan).
Country FED_USD ECB_EURO PBC_CNY
Argentina 70
Australia 30
Brazil 30
Belarus 20
Canada 30
Denmark 15 15
ECB 240
Hong Kong 200
Hungary 5
Iceland 1.5
Indonesia 100
Japan 120
Korea 30 180
Mexico 30
Malaysia 80
Norway 15
New Zealand 15
Poland 10
Sweden 30
Singapore 30
Switzerland 60
United Kingdom 80
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margin, but they aremost likelynot inﬁnite. To illustrate, the global swap size is constrainedby amultiple theglobalGDP, but practicality
suggests that they are elastic at the range that OECD countries will use them. Better institutional quality means lower moral hazard
which should implymore elastic access to larger swap lines,which seems to be the case for the swap lines between theOECDcountries.8
Fig. 5 plots the extent and the use of swap lines in the last two years. The earliest columns measure the size of the swap lines.
The remaining columns correspond to the actual use of the swap lines (subject to data availability). The ﬁgure reveals that the
usage of the Federal Reserve's dollar swaps has been limited. Since the announcements of dollar swap liquidity,9 the amounts
outstanding have declined across the swap receivers. Canada, Brazil, Singapore, and New Zealand have never used the dollar
swaps, and the total dollar swap liquidity extended had dropped to 57 billion USD as of September 30, 2009. These swap lines were
originally authorized through February 1, 2010, but has recently been re-scheduled to October 30, 2009.
We ﬁrst look at the percentage changes (%) of key variables from December 2007 to October 2009 between receivers and non-
receivers of swap lines. Table 3 reports for 86 developing countries (of which 8 are swap receivers)10 the changes in foreign
exchange reserves, nominal depreciation, short-term external debts and export credits (standard errors in brackets). The data are
taken from the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU) database. Since the end of 2007, in percentage term, the swap receivers on average
accumulated larger foreign reserves, experienced more nominal depreciation, de-leveraged bigger amount of short-term debts
and witnessed more decline in export credits. The evidence of short-term debts and export credits seem to suggest that the swap
receivers are more exposed to the (lagged) effects of a general deterioration of conditions in global short-term funding markets.
Obstfeld et al. (2009) ﬁnd that currencies of countries holding more reserves relative to M2 have tended to appreciate in the
crisis, whereas those with smaller foreign reserves have depreciated. They also argue that the dollar swaps to the emerging
markets have been largely symbolic since Brazil, Korea, and Singapore already had foreign reserves more than predicted.11 Our
evidence in Table 3 suggests that, as a group, the EM swap recipients have experienced signiﬁcantly larger nominal currency
depreciation and reduction of short-term debt stocks. Given that most of the EM's short-term external debts are foreign currency
denominated, the swap liquidity might have been in place to backstopping these emerging markets, substituting for a large
hoarding of foreign exchange reserves in a short period of time.
There is also a noticeable decline in export credits of developing countries, probably reﬂecting the effects of adverse global short-
term credit market conditions on the real side of global economy, namely international trade in goods and services. The ﬁnance
8 Swap lines resemble unsecured sovereign debt, and may be constrained by similar considerations. Hence, factors that explain better access to the sovereign
borrowing may also explain easier access to larger swap lines. These factors include low volatility, higher trade openness, credibility associated with history of
low incidence of default and good growth prospects, quality of institutions, etc. All these factors play a role in explaining the differential patterns of access and
the use of swap lines.
9 December 12, 2007 for the ECB and the Swiss National Bank, and 29 October 2008 for the other central banks, except the Bank of England and the Bank of
Japan, where the dollar swaps are implicitly always in place. The ﬁgure provides the amount of outstanding swap lines (billion USD) between the U.S. Federal
Reserve and foreign central banks as reported in the Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet.
10 The eight countries are Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Poland.
11 They predict the foreign reserves/GDP ratio as a function of ﬁnancial openness, the exchange rate regime, monetary depth (M2/GDP ratio), a dummy for the
advanced countries, and the ability to issue debt in one's own currency. From their estimation, Mexico and Hungary, however, had fewer foreign reserves than
predicted and their swap lines may have had a more substantive impact beyond mere signaling.
Fig. 5. This ﬁgure provides the amount of outstanding swap lines (billion USD) between the U.S. Federal Reserve and foreign central banks as reported in the
Federal Reserve SystemMonthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet. The authorized dates of these dollar swap liquidity are December
12, 2007 for the ECB and the Swiss National Bank, and 29 October 2008 for the other central banks (except the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, where the
dollar swaps are implicitly always in place). The earliest columns measure the size of the swap lines.
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literature consistently shows the importance of trade credits as a ﬁnancing vehicle between the buyers and sellers, as well as the
source of external ﬁnance along with bank loans.12 For all the emerging markets, export credits account for 10% of the short-term
external debts.13
Weexplore further the relationship between swapagreements and international trade for all possible countries. Tables 4-a and4-b
reports a seemingly unrelated regression of swap amount (dependent variable) on the size of bilateral trade between the country of
swap providers (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the People Bank of China) and swap recipients (22 countries in
Table 2) and non recipients (191 countries). The size of bilateral trade is the total sum from 2004 to 2008. The swap amount is in the
currency of providers. The estimating equation is given by
SWAPUSA→i = aUSA
EXPORTSUSA→i
∑
213
i
EXPORTSUSA→i
+ bUSA
IMPORTSUSA←i
∑
213
i
IMPORTSUSA←i
+ εUSA;i
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213
i
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i
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In using the aforementioned speciﬁcation, we focus on the role of swap lines extended during the latest ﬁnancial crisis. This
approach can be considered as a version of gravity model of international lending (e.g. Rose & Spiegel, 2004; Aizenman & Pasricha,
2010) inwhich conditions that lead two countries to bemore integrated are likely to lead tomore ﬁnancial activity between them. The
key variable for swap liquidity provision is a trade link asmeasured by the trade shares of swap recipients in theprovider's total trade.14
The estimation results in Table 4-a show that the importance of swap recipients as an export destination is associated with a
larger amount of swap liquidity extended from the US Federal Reserve and the People Bank of China. In the case of the dollar swap
lines, the results seem to be driven by the presence of Japan and the euro area, which account for 7 and 20% of the US exports,
respectively. For the swap liquidity extended by the People Bank of China, the association between the swap size and export share
is quite systematic: Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Argentina account for 12, 4, .9, 1.1 and .2% of the China's total
exports, respectively. An issue in Table 4-a is that most of the dependent variables are zero, with the exceptions of about a dozen
countries, the few recipients of swap lines. Therefore, we redid and report in Table 4-b the regression results using the Probit and
Tobit estimations, conﬁrming that bilateral trade ties are strongly associated with the dollar swap lines.
It is useful to check whether the marginal increase in bilateral trade (i.e. % increase in bilateral trade in the previous 5 years, as a
measure of swap provider's propensity to trade) is associated with the presence of swap agreements and their size. Using the SUR
speciﬁcation in Table 4-a, we address this issue ﬁrst by using OLS estimation and separating trade shares below and above 1%. The
estimation results continue to show that larger export destinations tend to receive larger swap lines from the US and China. Next, we
replace the bilateral trade shares with the marginal increases in bilateral trade. Speciﬁcally, we check whether an increase in China's
exports to Argentina relative to an increase in China's total exports from 2004 to 2008 increase the size of swap lines extended from
Table 3
This table compares percentage changes (%) of key variables from December 2007 to October 2009 between receivers and non-receivers of swap lines. Standard
deviations are in brackets. The sample includes 86 developing countries (of which 8 are swap receivers: Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea,
Mexico, and Poland). The data are derived from the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU).
Swap line(s)?
No Yes Diff.
% Change: Dec. 07–Oct. 09
ΔForeign reserves 5.620 14.846 −9.226
[3.875] [8.550] [9.387]
Nominal depreciation 8.685 18.463 −9.778
[2.044] [4.083] [4.566]
ΔShort-term debts −7.768 −26.130 18.363
[3.966] [6.269] [7.418]
ΔExport credits −2.711 −14.132 11.421
[2.173] [7.688] [7.989]
12 See Love, Preve and Sama-Allende (2007). In the context of international transactions, Jinjarak (2007) provides some evidence that lagged trade credits
forecast import, but not vice versa.
13 This ratio dropped from 26% in 1997, presumably due to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
14 Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) found that for the US, both the trade and ﬁnancial exposure to developing countries explains the recipients of FED's swap
lines. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from controlling for the ﬁnancial exposure of the country supplying the swap lines to the swap line recipient
country.
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China. The results suggest that the marginal increase of bilateral trade over the past ﬁve years is associated with the swap liquidity
extensions by both the US and China.
During the ﬁnancial turmoil of 2008, the frequent concern voiced towards the emerging markets has been on the
possibility that their size of foreign exchange reserves might have been too low relative to GDP and outstanding short-term
external debts. Indeed, history has never been short on providing the evidence of concurrent external liquidity and currency
runs. Fig. 6 plots the nominal depreciation (%) from July 2008 to June 2009 against [ST Debts−FX Reserves] / FX Reserves (%)
as of July 2008 for 23 emerging markets.15 The ﬁgure also provides a linear prediction (quarterly data) speciﬁcation (III) of
Table 5.
As noted earlier, Obstfeld et al. (2009)ﬁnd that currencies of countries holdingmore reserves have tended to appreciate in the
crisis. The estimation results in Table 5 show that, as expected, larger nominal depreciation is associated with larger [ST Debts−
FX Reserves] /FX Reserves and lower FX Reserves/GDP ratios. Both coefﬁcient estimates are, however, statistically weak. If we
run the regression with only one of these two variables, each variable has become highly signiﬁcant. As of July 2008, the
correlation between [ST Debts−FX Reserves] / FX Reserves and FX Reserves/GDP is −.43, which is rather high. Emerging
markets with larger external ﬁnancing gap tended to hold smaller amount of foreign reserves at the onset of the 2008 crisis.
The swap recipients in Fig. 6 seem to be indistinguishable from the non-recipients in terms of their nominal depreciation and
short-term ﬁnancing gap. Focusing on the recipient group, however, shows some difference between the recipients of China's
swaps (Argentina, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and the other swap recipients. In relation to the prediction line, the recipients of
China's swap have experienced smaller actual nominal depreciation than predicted. On the other hand the recipients of the US's
swaps (Brazil, Korea, and Mexico) and the ECB's swaps (Hungary and Poland) have had larger actual depreciation than the
predicted ones. One interpretation of this evidence is that the China's swap liquidity has been complementary to international
15 We narrow to these 23 countries as they make up the widely-followed S&P and MSCI emerging-market bond and equity indices.
Table 4-a
This table reports a seemingly unrelated regression of swap amount (dependent variable) on the size of bilateral trade between the country of swap providers (the
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the People Bank of China) and the receivers (22 countries in Table 2) and non receivers (191 countries). The size of
bilateral trade is the total sum from 2004 to 2008. The swap amount is in the currency of providers. Standard errors are in parentheses (*,**,*** denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively). The estimating equation is given by
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∑
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Trade share (% of total), SUR estimation
Bilateral trade shares USA EUR CHN
Exports 1.927 (0.839)** 0.052 (0.122) 2.922 (1.037)***
Imports −1.422 (0.752)* −0.056 (0.128) −2.067 (0.781)***
R-squared 0.041 0.001 0.038
Table 4-b
This table reports probit and tobit estimation of swap lines (dependent variable) on the size of bilateral trade between the country of swap providers (the Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the People Bank of China) and the receivers (22 countries in Table 2) and non receivers (191 countries). The size of
bilateral trade is the total sum from 2004 to 2008. The swap amount is in the currency of providers. Standard errors are in parentheses (*,**,*** denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1%, respectively).
Speciﬁcation Probit estimation Tobit estimation
Bilateral trade shares USA EURO zone China USA EURO zone China
% of Total Exports 0.220 (0.109)** 0.281 (0.505) 0.050 (0.072) 25.479 (13.600)* 5.966 (10.669) 14.920 (17.884)
% of Total Imports −0.197 (0.110)* −0.308 (0.553) −0.031 (0.056) −22.028 (13.176)* −6.521 (11.682) −9.475 (13.845)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0705 0.0114 0.0107 0.0315 0.0075 0.0071
Countries 213 213 213 213 213 213
Swap lines 11 4 6 11 4 6
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reserves as an effective insurance against the instability of its recipient's currency, while the swaps from the Federal Reserve and
the ECB have played a substitute role to the foreign reserves accumulation of the emerging markets.16
A limitation of our analysis is that, at this stage, we are unable to control for the factors accounting for foreign currency
pressure — for example, deleveraging pressures and drop in net exports, as well as country-speciﬁc balance sheet exposures.
Ideally, one needs to control for these variables in order to understand the marginal contribution of swap lines.17 Fig. 5 and
our estimation results are consistent with the possibility that the introduction of swap lines is more important than the actual
use of these lines. This would be the case if countries value to ﬂexibility granted by the swap line, providing the option value
of using it if the crisis would deepen. Yet, the actual use of a swap line may be associated with a stigma, implying that
countries would prefer to delay to use of swap line as a last resort (or at least as a secondary resort).18 Hence, somewhat
paradoxically, countries that are eager to have access to swap lines in a crisis may prefer to refrain from using it.
5. Concluding observations
One key stylized fact of global FX reserve management during the global ﬁnancial crisis has been the proliferation of swap
agreements between large central banks such as the US Fed, PBOC and ECB on one hand and the central banks of emergingmarkets
on the other hand. The most well-known of such agreements is the US$30 billion agreements between the US Fed and the central
banks of four systematically important emergingmarketswith strong fundamentals – Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Singapore –which
came into effect in October 2008. An important issue which arises in connection with the swap deals is the extent to which they
can mitigate the precautionary or self-insurance motive underlying the unprecedented reserve accumulation in developing
countries immediately prior to the global crisis. At a broader level, swap lines can substitute for reserves since the two serve the
same basic purpose — they are both international liquidity which can be called upon in case of unexpected shortages of
international liquidity. Upon closer inspection, there are clear limits to substitutability between swaps and reserves. Above all, the
credibility of reserves in the eyes of ﬁnancial markets is ultimately determined by the credibility of the central bank holding the
reserves while the credibility of swap lines is determined by the credibility of the central bank providing the liquidity support. Of
course, one may question the credibility of the US Fed in light of the fact that the global crisis originated in the US. However, the
somewhat paradoxical appreciation of the dollar at the slightest sign of global ﬁnancial distress – e.g. Dubai crisis – attests to the
enduring safe-haven status of the dollar.
Before we can meaningfully assess the prospective impact of swap agreements on reserve accumulation, it is necessary to look
at the nature of those agreements as well as their determinants. This hasmotivated the empirical analysis of this paper. Overall, the
16 An alternative interpretation is that Argentina, Indonesia, and Malaysia are less integrated with the global ﬁnancial system Brazil, Korea, and Mexico; thereby
the ﬁrst group faced smaller effective deleveraging pressure. This suggests that controlling ﬁnancial integration, balance sheet exposure, and deleveraging would
provide more satisfactory explanation of the cross country variation in exchange rate deprecation and international reserves loses during the 2008–9 crisis.
17 To illustrate this point, deeper depletion of international reserves by Korea relative to Brazil may reﬂect deeper drop of net exports and greater deleveraging
and exposure to short term foreign currency debt facing Korea than Brazil, inducing Korea to adjust both by depletion of 60 billion US $ of its IR, as well as sizable
depreciation, at times when Brazil's adjustment was mostly via the depreciation of the Real.
18 The crisis suggests lingering stigma concerns associated with accessing IMF credit lines, with some countries preferring using ad hock Central Banks swap
lines before using IMF credit lines.
Fig. 6. This ﬁgure plots the nominal depreciation (%) from July 2008 to June 2009 against the ST Debts−Foreign ReservesForeign Reserves (%) as of July 2008. The 23 countries below
make up the S&P and MSCI emerging bond and equity indices. The linear prediction (using quarterly data) is given by speciﬁcation (III) in Table 5.
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evidence indicates that by and large swap lines are extended only to fundamentally sound and well-managed emerging markets.
Crucially, sound fundamentals include healthy levels of FX reserves.
The highly selective nature of swap recipientsmeans that amajority of developing countries will not have access to swap facilities.
For those countries, swap lines cannot possibly be a substitute for reserve accumulation for the simple reason that the central banks of
large countries are unwilling to provide them with swap lines. Of course, there are other substitutes for individual reserve
accumulation suchas regional reservepoolingarrangementor access to IMF credit lines.More fundamentally, ourevidence shows that
large central banks tend to extend swap facilities only to those countries with which they have strong ﬁnancial and trade linkages. In
other words, while swaps can contribute to the global public good of global ﬁnancial stability, in fact large central banks provide
liquidity support onlywhen it is in the self-interest of their respective countries to do so. For example, as noted earlier, exposure of US
banks was the single most important explanation for why the US entered into swap deals with Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Singapore.
In the context of swap lines motivated by the self-interest of providing countries, a particularly interesting result from our
empirical analysis is the strong inﬂuence of trade, in particular exports, in the determination of recipient countries. That is, large
central banks tend to enter into swap agreements with their counterparts in countries which are important export markets.
Although this pattern holds for large central banks in general, what is striking is that it helps to explain the recent rise of the PBOC
as a major provider of swap facilities. For all its spectacular growth, China's ﬁnancial system is still under-developed and lags far
behind the country's real economy. The depth, breadth, liquidity and sophistication of its ﬁnancial markets fall far below that of
ﬁnancial center countries, which explains why China invests so much of its savings in US ﬁnancial markets. Furthermore, the
credibility of the PBOC is not noticeably greater than that of central banks in other emerging markets even though it sits atop the
world's largest stockpile of reserves. Nevertheless, the emergence of China as a globally signiﬁcant trading power gives the yuan
some intrinsic value despite the country's ﬁnancial under-development. In particular, the yuan can be used to pay for imports from
China, which is large and growing in many countries given the sustained rapid growth of China's exports. The inclusion of
countries such as Argentina and Belarus, not known for strong fundamentals or soundmanagement, among PBOC's swap recipient
countries points to the overarching dominance of export markets as the key criterion. Be that as it may, the growth of yuan-
dominated swap lines may be a precursor to the eventual emergence of the yuan as a new reserve currency.
The Korean experience is highly signiﬁcant because it is a real-world case of a country simultaneously using both FX reserves
and swap deals to deal with ﬁnancial instability during the global ﬁnancial crisis. One possible interpretation of the Korean saga is
that more is always better when it comes to reserves since even an ample stockpile of reserves failed to prevent sharp currency
depreciation. However, such amisinterpretationwould bemisguided and inappropriate since it is doubtful whethermore reserves
would have made any difference. When market conﬁdence is shattered, FX market intervention to stabilize exchange rate
becomes ineffective, even if the economy has sound fundamentals. That is, reserves fail to perform their precautionary or self-
insurance function when tail-end risks are realized. In fact, in the case of Korea, declining reserves themselves intensiﬁed market
fears and concerns, forming a vicious cycle in which adverse market sentiment drive down reserves via FX market intervention
and the decline in reserves, in turn, further dampens market sentiment. The timing of market movements suggests that BOK's
three swap agreements, in particular the agreement with the US Fed, played a pivotal role in calming down the growing market
hysteria over a possible dollar shortage. Quite clearly, the swap agreement would have been much less effective in the absence of
strong fundamentals, including healthy reserve levels. A plausible interpretation of the Korean experience seems to be that swap
lines which have important signaling effects, such as the BOK-Fed deal, can restore the precautionary or self-insurance function of
reserves. This function can temporarily freeze up during severe shocks but the Korean experience shows that swap deals can
revive the function by restoring market conﬁdence.
One big puzzle in Asia's FX reserve management in the global crisis period is the virtual invisibility of the Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI). Itwasprecisely the typeofﬁnancial turbulence that visitedKorea in the secondhalf of 2008, precipitatedbymarket jitters about
prospective shortage of dollar liquidity, that the architects of CMI had in mind. However, Korea turned to the US Fed for primary
supportwhen push came to shove and the country teetered toward a full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial crisis. Even CMI partners PBOC andBank of
Japan played only a secondary role and outside the CMI framework at that.What is needed for member countries tomake greater use
of the CMI in the future is more concrete and speciﬁc governance structure and implementation details.19 Encouragingly, as noted
earlier, substantive progress has been made toward the multilateralization of the CMI (CMIM) since October 2008. In fact, the global
19 Curiously, the BOJ swaps lines were available to Korea under the CMI, not even tied to the IMF-linkage. Yet, Korea did not ask for them. Apparently, Korea
preferred accessing the US FED Swap lines to accessing swap lines authorized by the CMI.
Table 5
This table tests whether ST Debts−Foreign ReservesForeign Reserves and
Foreign Reserves
GDP of July 2008 (explanatory variables) are associated with the nominal depreciation
during June 2008 to June 2009 (dependent variable). The sample includes 23 emerging markets (with quarterly data and included in MSCI). Standard errors are in
parentheses (*,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1%, respectively).
(I) (II) (III)
(SE-IR)/IR .21 (.09)** .16 (.10)
IR/GDP −.37 (.19)* −.24 (.20)
R-Squared .19 .15 .24
Countries 23 23 23
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ﬁnancial crisis has served as a catalyst for CMIM. The resolution of politically sensitive issues such as the relative share of contributions
among member countries, as well as the establishment of clear conditions for withdrawal of reserves and an independent regional
surveillance unit, is expected to signiﬁcantly boost the attractiveness of CMI as a source of funds during a crisis. Despite the progress of
CMIM, a range of issues relating to the governance, operations and technical details of the CMI still remain unresolved. These include,
for example, precisely how withdrawal requests will be evaluated and precisely how funds will be disbursed.
In addition to deepening regional reserve pooling arrangements – i.e. the CMI – another policy option for mitigating the need for
precautionary reserves is to lengthen the duration of swap agreements. The Korean experience shows that swap agreements can help
restoremarket conﬁdence at a time of severe crisis. There is an intriguing possibility that swaps can helpmaintainmarket conﬁdence
even during normal non-crisis periods. The evidence of our analysis suggests that swap lines are motivated primarily by the self-
interest of provider countries, but in fact they deliver substantial beneﬁts for both provider and recipient countries. For provider
countries, swaps help to safeguard the economic interests they have in countries to which they extend swap lines. The interests may
take different forms– e.g. the exposure of US banks or a signiﬁcant exportmarket – but they can be substantial. For recipient countries,
swaps help to restore ﬁnancial stability during episodes of extreme ﬁnancial distress when even large stockpiles of FX reserves fail to
reassure markets. It is entirely possible that swaps are mutually beneﬁcial not only during crises but also during normal non-crisis
periods. Formalizing and institutionalizing swap lines so that they are transformed from temporary anti-crisismeasures tomore long-
term mechanisms for liquidity support may dampen the need for precautionary reserve hoarding.
At a broader level, the desirability of the unprecedented scale and speed of Asia's reserve accumulation in the pre-crisis period
is debatable. According to the dollar standard or BrettonWoods II view, Asia seeks to achieve rapid economic growth by adopting
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies that keep exchange rates very competitive on a sustained basis. A centerpiece of such
policies is systematic intervention in the FXmarket to purchase US dollars and de facto pegging to the US dollar. The rapid build-up
of reserves may be a visible consequence of those policies. According to this interpretation, the global ﬁnancial crisis has shattered
the myth that the dollar standard was sustainable since it beneﬁted both Asia – rapid growth driven by rapid growth of exports –
and the US – which obtained cheap external ﬁnancing due to massive Asian purchases of low-yielding US government bonds.
Arguably, some interpret the global crisis as a painful wake-up call that Asian over-production counterbalanced by US over-
consumption is an unsustainable game which harms all countries.
Finally, since ﬁnancial instability in emerging markets is usually the result of volatile capital ﬂows and the fundamental purpose of
precautionary reserves is to limitﬁnancial instability, some emergingmarketsmay opt to dampen the precautionary accumulation of FX
reserves by controlling volatile capitalﬂows. According to this argument, controlledﬁnancial integrationwhich retains some restrictions
on capital ﬂowsmay limit ﬁnancial instability, which, in turn, will limit the need for precautionary FX reserves. One possible solution to
suddenstops anddeleveragingmaybeaPigovian tax scheme,where inﬂowsofportfolioﬂowsandexternal borrowingabovea threshold
may be taxed at an increasing rate, reﬂecting the resultant higher exposure of the central bank to a possible future bailout of the banking
system.20 Such a tax scheme, implemented before banks' external borrowing takes place, may curtail exposure to the growing hazard
facing the recipient country due to possible de leveraging.21 It may induce the foreign investor to internalize the externality associated
with possible costs of deleveraging, and reduce the cost of self insurance by funding some of the self insurance.
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